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Failure to Warn of a Known
Environmental Danger: Limits on United
States Liability Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA)
I. Introduction
Failure to warn has provided the basis for personal injury
claims brought against the United States in a variety of contexts. However, only in recent years has this theory of liability
emerged as an issue in toxic tort actions involving the federal
government. As public concern over the risks created by toxic
substances and other environmental hazards has grown, exposure victims, lacking any other recourse, have turned to the
courts for redress, relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)1 as the basis for their claims. In deciding such claims,
federal courts have had to determine, as a threshold issue,
whether the discretionary function exception of the FTCA2
protects the United States from liability for failure to warn
members of the general public of a known environmental danger or hazard. Resolution of this issue has followed an uncertain path because of confusion surrounding application of the
discretionary function exception.
Much of the confusion has resulted from the failure of
the federal judiciary to develop a uniform standard for determining when any given governmental activity falls within the
exception. Despite this confusion, most courts declined to liberally interpret the exception until the Supreme Court issued
its decision in United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1982). The Federal
Tort Claims Act was adopted by Congress in 1946 as a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity in situations of recognized private liability. For a general discussion of federal tort claims, see L. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims: Administrative and
Judicial Remedies (1983).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); see infra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines).3 Although Varig involved no failure to warn claims, the decision altered the
course of failure to warn litigation by sharply limiting the
scope of governmental liability under the FTCA.
This comment traces the development of the failure to
warn theory in an environmental context, examines judicial
responses on both sides of the issue, and assesses the viability
of the theory in light of Varig and other recent Supreme
Court decisions addressing the discretionary function exception. Part II examines the liability of the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act and reviews the leading Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the exception. Part III analyzes
pre-Varig decisions which have permitted failure to warn
claims. Part IV reviews recent decisions which applied the
Varig holding to deny recovery. Part V examines the Supreme
Court decision in Berkovitz v. United States' which limited
the Varig holding. Part VI assesses the viability of the failure
to warn theory in light of both Varig and Berkovitz and suggests an alternative approach for determining governmental
liability under the FTCA.
II.

Supreme Court Interpretation of the
Discretionary Function Exception

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States
may be held liable for the wrongful actions and omissions of
its employees acting within the scope of their employment in
circumstances in which a private person would be held liable
under state law.5 However, section 2680(a) of the Act ex3. 467 U.S. 797 (1984) [hereinafter Varig].
4. 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
5. The Act permits suits against the federal government:
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
The Act provides further that "[tihe United States shall be liable ... relating to
tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
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pressly excludes any claims arising from discretionary acts or
omissions, even when an abuse of discretion is involved.6 For
such claims, the exception acts as a jurisdictional bar to preclude the action.' In failure to warn cases, the standard defense raised by the government is that a decision not to warn
is a discretionary decision covered by the exception and,
therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
The Supreme Court decision in Varig stated that the discretionary function exception "marks the boundary between
Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United
States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities
from exposure to suit by private individuals." However, the
Court has failed to define the limits of governmental immulike circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
6. The exceptions to governmental liability under the Act are enumerated in 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (1982). The discretionary function exception, contained in section
2680(a), precludes:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
7. There is some uncertainty among federal courts concerning whether state or
federal law takes precedence in determining jurisdiction. A few courts have relied on
a negligence standard to determine jurisdiction, claiming jurisdiction when the actions of a government employee in implementing a statute or regulation fall below a
standard of reasonable care. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 337
(D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694
(1988). However, the more prevalent view, particularly among federal appellate
courts, is that the discretionary function provision determines subject matter jurisdiction. Courts subscribing to this view typically disregard state tort law principles of
liability where the discretionary function is found to apply. See General Public Utilities Corporation v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 1984), (holding that
negligence is irrelevant to discretionary function inquiry), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228
(1985); Cisco v. United States, 768 F.2d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 1985) (declining to address
plaintiffs' "Good Samaritan" argument that the government had undertaken to perform a service which required the exercise of due care); Wells v. United States, 655 F.
Supp. 715, 719 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that the United States' potential liability
under the "Good Samaritan" theory of negligence is not controlling in the face of the
discretionary function exception to liability), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 836 (1988).
8. 467 U.S. at 808.
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nity with any precision or to provide consistent guidelines for
lower courts to follow in applying the exception.
The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the discretionary function exception in Dalehite v. United States.,
Dalehite involved multiple personal injury and property
claims brought against the United States after a massive explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer.1 0 Plaintiffs alleged
that the government had been negligent in permitting shipment of a dangerous explosive to a populated area without
sufficient investigation or warning." The Supreme Court, in a
four-to-three decision, held all the government's actions in
manufacturing, packing and transporting the fertilizer exempt
from liability under the Act. 2 The Court broadly interpreted
the exception to include not only policy determinations made
in initiating the program, but also decisions later made by
subordinates responsible for implementing policy. ' s The opinion drew a distinction between non-actionable discretion at
the policy or planning level and actionable negligence at the
implementation or operational level.14 However, the decision
left unclear the precise line between planning and operational
level activities because the specific holding of the case extended discretionary function immunity to arguably operational acts. 5
9. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
10. Id. at 17. The federal government had directed and controlled both production and distribution of the fertilizer. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 23.
12. Id. at 38-42. The district court had cited four specific acts of negligence related to the manufacture of the fertilizer: (1) using a coating which rendered the fertilizer highly susceptible to explosion, (2) packing the fertilizer in paper bags which
were easily ignited and subject to tearing, (3) placing the fertilizer in the bags at a
very high temperature in a manner which prevented cooling, and (4) failing to label
the fertilizer as a dangerous explosive and fire hazard. Id. at 45-47 (Appendix to
Opinion of the Court). The Supreme Court determined that these allegedly negligent
acts did not subject the government to liability because the decisions involved were
all planning-level decisions important to the feasibility of the government's program.
Id. at 42.
13. Id. at 35-36. The majority's broad language, holding that "[wihere there is
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion," suggested that almost any
exercise of judgment would invoke the exception. Id. at 36.
14. Id. at 42.
15. In his dissent, Justice Jackson maintained that only the initial decision to
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Two years later, in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,16
the Supreme Court implicitly rejected its expansive reading of
the discretionary function exception in Dalehite by concluding that the exception did not protect an operational activity
17
undertaken in pursuance of a discretionary policy decision.
In Indian Towing, the Court found the government liable for
damages caused by the Coast Guard's negligence in failing to
properly inspect and repair a lighthouse and in failing to warn
vessels that the light was not functioning properly. 8 The government conceded that the maintenance of the lighthouse was
an operational activity and the discretionary function exception did not apply.1 9 Nevertheless, the government argued
that the operation of the lighthouse was a "uniquely governmental function" for which it could not be held liable under
the FTCA.2 The Court dismissed this argument, basing its
decision on tort law negligence theory.2 1 The Court commented that the Coast Guard was under no obligation to operate the lighthouse, 2 but once it made a discretionary decision
to warn the public of danger by providing this service, it was
obligated to use reasonable care in performing its "[G]ood Samaritan" task.23
institute the fertilizer program was discretionary. He rejected the majority's characterization of the operational activities of subordinates responsible for carrying out
details as "planning" level activities. Id. at 58.
16. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 64.
20. Id. The government argued that the FTCA provision imposing liability "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" excluded activities that a private person could not perform. Id. (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (1948)).
21. Id. at 67-68. In rejecting the government's argument, the Court stated that
the legislative history of the Act provided no support for such "finespun and capricious" distinctions. The Court also emphasized the Act's "broad and just purpose" to
compensate victims of the government's negligence where a private person would be
liable. Id. at 67-68.
22. Id. at 69.
23. Id. at 64-65, 69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 323, 324A (1965)
(One who undertakes to render services to another may be liable for negligent performance if his conduct contributes to the injury by increasing the risk of harm or by
inducing others to rely on proper performance of the service).
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed Indian Towing in
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States2 ' by asserting the broad scope
of liability under the FTCA. As in Indian Towing, the Court
maintained that the only test for governmental liability provided by the Act was whether a private person in similar circumstances would be held liable.25 In fact, the Court stated
that "[t]o the extent that there was anything to the contrary
in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected by Indian
Towing."2
In Varig, the Supreme Court significantly limited the
scope of FTCA liability by reaffirming Dalehite2" and seeming
to create a blanket exclusion for all federal regulatory activity.2" Varig held that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) was not liable under the FTCA for failure to detect
and remedy specific defects before certifying aircraft for use
in commercial flight.2 9 After reviewing the legislative history
of the FTCA, the Court identified two criteria to be used in
determining whether the discretionary function exception applies to protect the actions of government agencies and employees from liability. The first is whether the conduct in
question is "of the nature and quality that Congress intended
24. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). Rayonier involved allegations charging the United
States Forest Service with negligently allowing a fire to start on government land and
failing to use due care in extinguishing the fire. Id. at 318-19.
25. Id. at 319.
26. Id.
27. 467 U.S. at 811-12. The Court repudiated the notion that Dalehite had been
undermined by its subsequent decisions in Indian Towing and Rayonier. The Court
maintained that since neither of these cases had specifically addressed the discretionary function exception, this aspect of the Dalehite decision remained essentially intact. Id. at 811, 813 n.10.
28. See Comment, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court Narrows
the Scope of Government Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. AIR
LAW & COM. 197, 222 (1985). (The Supreme Court in Varig created a "regulatory/
nonregulatory distinction that applies the discretionary function exception to the
negligent operational acts of regulatory agencies.").
29. 467 U.S. at 821. Varig consolidated two Ninth Circuit airline disaster cases,
United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979) and S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. United States, 692 F.2d
1205 (9th Cir. 1982). In both cases, the court of appeals found the government liable
under California's "Good Samaritan" rule. 467 U.S. at 801, 803.
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to shield from tort liability." 30 The second is whether the conduct represents the exercise of discretionary regulatory authority.3 1 The Court stated that the underlying purpose of the
exception, as reflected in the legislative history's emphasis on
protecting regulatory activities, is to prevent judicial interference with an agency's social, economic and political policy
decisions. 2
As the appellees' claims challenged the FAA's inspection
and certification process itself, the Court outlined the agency's
procedures for ensuring that aircraft comply with safety regulations. The Court noted that the process adopted by the FAA
placed primary responsibility for ensuring compliance on the
aircraft manufacturer. 3 The FAA's role was limited largely to
monitoring manufacturer compliance through a spot-check
system. 34 The Supreme Court found that the decision to use
this system was "plainly discretionary" and explained that the
agency had discretionary regulatory authority to determine
the extent to which it would supervise airline safety
35
procedures.
On the basis of this reasoning, the Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' determination that the FAA inspection and certification activities did not involve the kind of
policymaking discretion contemplated by the exception.3
"[W]hatever else the discretionary function exception may include," the Court held, "it plainly was intended to encompass
the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a
regulator of the conduct of private individuals. 3 7 Thus, any
tort action based on the practice of the FAA in inspecting and
certifying aircraft is presumptively exempt from liability
38
under the Act.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

813.
813-14.
814.
816.
816-17.
819-20.
802.
813-14.
815-16.
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The Court's most recent decision addressing the discretionary function exception, Berkovitz v. United States,3 9 narrowed the Varig holding by rejecting the notion that Varig
created a per se exemption for all regulatory acts and decisions of federal agencies.40 In Berkovitz, the Court held that
the exception protects only discretionary actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy."1
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Dalehite, Indian
Towing, Rayonier, Varig and Berkowitz have failed to delineate a clear boundary between discretionary and non-discretionary governmental acts. The Court's direction is obfuscated
by its failure to establish judicial predictability and provide
meaningful guidance as manifested by the inconsistency of
subsequent lower court decisions.
III.

Pre-Varig Decisions: Judicial Acceptance of
the Failure to Warn Theory

Pre-Varig cases provide ample precedent for imposing a
duty to warn where the government's exercise of a discretionary function either creates or facilitates a hazardous condition. In most of these cases, courts have treated failure to
warn allegations as an independent issue to be analyzed separately from other actions and decisions, even where the underlying activity is held to be discretionary. Some courts determine liability by applying the planning/operational test set
forth in Dalehite and finding liability when the government's
failure to warn constitutes negligence at an operational level.
One case which illustrates this approach is Smith v.
United States,"2 in which a visitor to Yellowstone National
Park sued the government for damages after falling into a
heated thermal pool. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that
the government's decision to leave an area of the park undeveloped was discretionary, but ruled that the subsequent deci39. 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
40. Id. at 1959-61.
41. Id. at 1960. See infra notes 105-26 and accompanying text analyzing the
Berkovitz decision.
42. 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
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sion not to post warnings was to be analyzed independently of
other decisions. 4 3 The court held that the government's failure
to warn of known dangers or to provide safeguards for the
pool could not "rationally be deemed the exercise of a discretionary function."" The court reasoned that if it were to accept the government's interpretation of the discretionary
function exception, a government agency would be able to
avoid almost any duty under tort law by simply making a policy decision to ignore it."4
The Ninth Circuit applied a similar analysis in Lindgren
v. United States." In Lindgren, the court held that although
the operation of a dam constituted a discretionary activity
protected from liability, the subsequent failure to post warnings, alerting recreational users that the government had lowered the level of the river, was not necessarily entitled to the
same immunity.' 7 The court rejected the assumption that the
failure to warn was discretionary simply because the hazard
which allegedly caused the injury resulted from the exercise of
a discretionary function . Applying the planning/operational
test, the court maintained that decisions concerned with dayto-day operations, even though they may involve an element
of discretion, are not covered by the exception.' 9
In Medley v. United States,50 a California district court
ruled that an FAA decision not to warn pilots of the known
dangers of a particular route charted by the agency was an
43. Id. at 876. The government argued that the decision not to provide warnings
or safety precautions was part of a policy decision to leave an area of the park undeveloped. However, the court ruled that the government could not evade responsibility
for failing to warn by "assimilating this decision" into the decision to leave certain
areas of the park undeveloped. The court reasoned that the duty to warn arose when
the government decided to open the park to the public. Id. at 876-77.
44. Id. at 877.
45. Id.
46. 665 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. Id. at 982. The allegations charged that the government failed to provide
warnings even though it was aware of the recreational use of the river and the hazard
created by its alteration of the water level. Id. at 979.
48. Id. at 979.
49. Id. at 980 (quoting Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
1979)).
50. 543 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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operational decision subject to liability under the FTCA.5 1
The court determined that the plaintiffs' cause of action did
not arise out of the discretionary decision to chart the route
but out of the hazard created by charting a dangerous mountain pass as the only route on the chart.2
The court first considered the decision to chart the route
and likened this decision to that made by the Coast Guard to
operate a lighthouse in Indian Towing.5 3 The court found that
the decision to chart a route in Medley, as in Indian Towing,
involved policy considerations affecting public safety and fell
squarely within the discretionary function exception.5 4 To
hold otherwise, the court observed, would disrupt the efficient
operation of the FAA. 5 The court then addressed the failure
to warn issue. Following the reasoning of Lindgren, the court
asserted that a decision not to warn does not automatically
assume the discretionary character of the decision which precipitated the danger.56 The court noted that while failure to
warn of a natural danger was generally considered discretionary, in this case the government had created the danger by
charting a particularly hazardous route without alerting pilots
to the risks involved.5 7 Given these circumstances, the court
concluded that the FAA's action fell within the general rule
recognizing a duty to warn where the government's actions
created a foreseeable risk of serious injury. 8
The court further determined that the decision to chart
the route was a "Good Samaritan" act which the FAA was
required to perform with due care. 9 If the government
breached this duty of care, it was negligent and could not es51. Id. at 1221.
52. Id. at 1220.
53. Id. at 1218.
54. Id. at 1219.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1220.
57. Id. The court noted the similarity between this case and Smith v. United
States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976), in which a duty to warn similarly arose because
the plaintiff was attracted to a hazardous situation by the actions of the government.
Id. at 1220-21.
58. Id. at 1221.
59. Id. at 1221-22.
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cape liability
exception."

by

IV.

invoking

the

discretionary

function

Post-Varig Decisions: Judicial Rejection of
the Failure to Warn Theory

As applied by lower courts, Varig significantly restricted
plaintiffs' prospects for recovery in actions against the United
States. Courts which formerly recognized a cause of action for
the government's failure to warn of a dangerous condition
abandoned the mode of analysis suggested by the Indian
Towing line of cases in favor of Varig's more expansive view
of the discretionary function exception. 1 Some of these courts
have held that Varig presumptively precludes all tort claims
arising from the government's regulatory activities.6 2 These
courts generally treated a decision to warn as incidental to
other regulatory decisions and, therefore, entitled to the same
immunity. Other courts have taken a somewhat more conservative approach, holding that the exception protects only
discretionary policy decisions. 3 The inquiry in these cases
usually centers on whether any balancing of social, political,
or economic factors entered into the decision. From the plaintiff's perspective, however, this distinction has had little practical significance since, as a review of recent cases suggests,
under either analysis, the discretionary function defense has
proven to be virtually insurmountable. 4
One case which dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on the theory that Varig presumptively exempts all regulatory activity
60. Id.
61. In light of the Varig decision, the Ninth Circuit implicitly abandoned the
planning/operational test used in Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978 (9th Cir.
1982).
62. See Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1987); Allen v. United
States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
63. See General Public Utilities Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985); Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283 (1st
Cir. 1985).
64. The discretionary function exception has been held not to apply when government action violates a pre-existing safety policy. See Aslakson v. United States,
790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988); Mandel v. United
States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1986).
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is Bacon v. United States.6" In Bacon, road workers sued the
federal government to recover for injuries allegedly caused by
exposure to dioxin 66 while they were repairing roads in Times
Beach, Missouri.17 The complaint charged that both the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which had provided a block grant for the repair
work, and the Environmental Protection Agency, which had
conducted tests for dioxin in the area, had been negligent in
failing to warn the road workers of the dioxin contamination.6 8 In upholding governmental immunity, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that in Varig the Supreme Court
"recognized that Congress clearly intended for the exception
to apply when the government was involved in regulatory activity."6 " The court distinguished cases in which failure to
warn of a hazardous condition violated a pre-existing agency
policy.7 0 Since, in the present case, the EPA had not adopted
any safety policy requiring the agency to warn persons exposed to dioxin, the court characterized its failure to do so as
a discretionary decision covered by the exception. 1
65. 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1987).
66. Dioxin, a byproduct of many chemical processes, has been found to cause
cancer, damage to the immune system and birth defects when tested on animals, even
in extremely low doses. Based on these tests, the Environmental Protection Agency
classifies dioxin as an "acutely toxic" substance and a human carcinogen. 48 Fed.
Reg. 14, 514-01 (1983).
67. 810 F.2d at 827.
68. Id. at 828. Repair of the roads in Times Beach, Missouri occurred in November and December 1982. Id. In late November and early December of the same year,
the EPA conducted extensive testing which confirmed the presence of dioxin along
the roadways. Because dioxin, in the language of the EPA, is "one of the most toxic
substances known to man ... carcinogenic and suspected to have effects in reproductive systems," 48 Fed. Reg. 9311-01 (1983), the agency proposed to add Times Beach
to its National Priorities List in March 1983. Id.
69. Id. at 829.
70. Id. The court cited Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1986),
and Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1986), as holding that the exception does not apply once the government has adopted a specific safety policy requiring warnings.
71. Id. at 830. The court reasoned as follows:
Although the EPA was conducting tests in Times Beach for the presence of hazardous wastes at the time of appellants' alleged injury, it had not reached any conclusions regarding the presence of dioxin, nor had it adopted a safety policy requiring
warnings to persons exposed to areas potentiallycontaminated by dioxin. Appellants'
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In Allen v. United States, 2 the Tenth Circuit relied on
Varig to reverse a district court finding of governmental liability tor failure to adequately inform the public and monitor
off-site exposure to radioactive fallout from open-air atomic
bomb tests held in Nevada in the 1950s and 1960s. 73 Comparing the regulatory function of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) with that of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in Varig, the court found that the AEC enjoyed even
broader discretion than the FAA in determining how to protect public safety.74 That discretion embraced not only AEC
policy determinations but lower level operational decisions as
well. 75 The court held further that whether the alleged failure
to warn was a matter of "deliberate choice" or "mere oversight" was of no consequence 76 because despite broad congressional directives to protect the public health and minimize the
danger from explosion, the discretionary function exception
protected "all challenged actions" surrounding the government's testing program.7 7
Some post-Varig decisions expressly or impliedly reject
the notion that all regulatory conduct is discretionary conclaim is thus based upon a "failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function,"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
Id.
In denying recovery, the Bacon court closely followed the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Cisco v. United States, 768 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1985), which denied a
similar claim against the EPA for failure to warn property owners that dioxin-contaminated soil had been used in a residential landfill. Id. at 829.
72. 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 1424. Allen involved nearly 1200 plaintiffs alleging 500 deaths and injuries. Twenty-four of these claims were heard by the district court which found for
the government on fourteen of the claims and against the government on nine, with
one outstanding. Id. at 1418-19. On appeal by the government, the Tenth Circuit held
that the lower court ruling could not stand in light of Varig which was decided after
the district court judgment. Id. at 1421.
74. Id. at 1421. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585, 60 Stat. 755
(1946), authorized the AEC to conduct atomic bomb tests. Atomic Energy Act of 1946
§§ 6(a). The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., the current statute,
conferred the same authority. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 2121. The AEC was abolished in 1974 and its functions assumed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the Energy Research and Development Administration. Allen, 816 F.2d at 1419 n.2.
75. Id. at 1421.
76. Id. at 1422 n.5.
77. Id. at 1424.
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duct. However, this caution has not deterred these courts
from attributing to regulatory agencies broad discretion in
performance of their safety function.
In General Public Utilities Corp. v. United States,78 the
court dismissed the claims of the owners of Three Mile Island
against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for failure to
warn of safety hazards. The court ruled that discretion rests
with the Commission to determine which problems are important enough to merit investigation and warning.79
Some courts, declining to limit Varig to its factual context, have applied its reasoning to cases involving non-regulatory activity. In Begay v. United States,80 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a district court's ruling that the government's failure
to alert uranium miners to the possible hazards of radiation
exposure was a discretionary decision exempt from liability
for breach of a "Good Samaritan" duty."' The plaintiffs, Navajo Indian miners, alleged that the government's inaction had
exposed them to unnecessary risk, causing them to contract
lung cancer and other diseases. 82 The plaintiffs' allegations
centered on a medical study of the miners conducted by the
United States Public Health Service (PHS) during their employment in the mines. 3 Applying the principles affirmed in
Varig,84 the court ruled that the PHS decision not to disclose
the potential danger to the miners, which had been made in
order to ensure their cooperation, constituted a judgment of
"the best course of action . . . under the existing circum-

stances." 85 The court noted that the PHS had been aware of
the potential danger to the miners and that even eight years
after the original study, when statistical data left little doubt
about the hazards of radiation exposure, the PHS chose not to
78. 745 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985).
79. 745 F.2d at 247.
80. 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 1060, 1062.
82. Id. at 1060.
83. Id. at 1061.
84. The court acknowledged that Begay did not involve regulatory actions but
determined that extending itsapplication to nonregulatory activity would not be inappropriate. Id. at 1062.
85. Id. at 1065.
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alert the miners. 6 These facts did not deter the court from
holding that the agency's failure to warn was the type of decision Congress intended to insulate from liability under the
FTCA
Two years later, the Tenth Circuit decided Barnson v.
United States8" on nearly identical facts, reaching the same
result. Plaintiff miners charged the PHS with breaching nondiscretionary "Good Samaritan" duties in failing to disclose
the results of medical and environmental studies and the AEC
with violating a statutory duty to protect the miners from the
effects of radiation. 9 Noting the similarity to Begay, the court
held that the discretionary function precluded recovery on
both claims, regardless of any negligence on the government's
part.90
Finally, in Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp.,91 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the General Service
Administration's (GSA) decision to sell surplus asbestos "as
is" without warning labels fell within the discretionary function exception. 2 Present and former employees initiated the
action against Johns-Manville and other suppliers for injuries
resulting from exposure to asbestos.93 The defendants then
filed third party indemnity claims against the United States
government.9 In denying these claims, the court found that
the GSA's use of the term "as is" was evidence of "a decision
in which there was room for discretion."9 The court reasoned
86. Id. at 1065-66.
87. Id. at 1066.
88. 816 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987).
89. Id. at 551, 553.
90. Id. at 554-55. The court determined that the decision not to alert miners of
the health risks was based on political policy rather than medical considerations. Id.
at 553.
91. 795 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 304.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 308. The court relied on Varig, even though, as the court noted, this
case concerned the government's duty as a supplier of a dangerous chattel and, therefore, did not meet the second criterion set forth in Varig for determining applicability
of the discretionary function exception: that the challenged conduct involve the government acting in its role as a regulator of individual conduct. Id. at 307 (citing
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further that the failure to label the asbestos, which was sold
in response to a congressional directive to prevent market disturbances and increase government revenues, was not the type
of common law tort which could subject the government to
FTCA liability.9 6 The court rejected the third-party plaintiffs'
contention, with which the district court had concurred, that
if isolated from the underlying decision to dispose of the asbestos, failure to warn could not be considered a discretionary
policy decision.9 7 The court maintained that such compartmentalization was inconsistent with Varig's proscription
against judicial second-guessing of agency decisions.98
The practical effect of the Varig decision has been to restore the federal government to a "privileged position of legal
irresponsibility." 99 As some courts have recognized, in the
wake of Varig, the FTCA has proven to be no more than "a
false promise" offering little hope of redress in all but minor
"fender-bender" claims.1"' Prior to Varig, federal courts typically imposed a duty to warn in situations where the actions
of the government created a foreseeable hazard or danger by
increasing the risk of injury to others or by inducing reliance
on careful performance of a service. 10 1 Under this theory, the
government's failure to disclose the results of tests for the
presence of a toxic substance, 0 2 or of medical studies to deVarig, 467 U.S. at 813-14).
96. Id. at 308.
97. Id. at 309. The court stated that "[tihe test is not whether the government
actually considered each possible alternative in the universe of options, but whether
the conduct was of the type associated with the exercise of official discretion." Id. at
308-09. See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d
116 (3d Cir. 1988) (In determining whether the discretionary function exception applies, "the relevant question is not whether an explicit balancing is proved, but
whether the decision was susceptible to policy analysis."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2902 (1988).
98. Smith, 795 F.2d at 309.
99. 1 L. Jayson, supra note 1, § 51, at 2-5.
100. Allen, 816 F.2d at 1424-25 (McKay concurring); see also Wells v. United
States, 655 F. Supp. 715, 724 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 836 (1989).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 323, 324A (1965).
102. See Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1987); Cisco v. United
States, 768 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1985); Wells v. United States, 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 836 (1989).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/9

16

LIMITS ON U.S. LIABILITY

1989]

termine the effects of radiation exposure on miners, 103 would
arguably constitute actionable negligence. The initial decision
to undertake the studies or testing would be deemed discretionary, but not the subsequent failure to warn. However, as
the post-Varig cases demonstrate, federal courts have consistently ignored established precedent by treating failure to
warn as an incidental component of other regulatory decisions
and by inappropriately extending discretionary function immunity to virtually all regulatory activity. In their reluctance
to entertain actions involving regulatory agencies, federal
courts have incorrectly assumed that the broad statutory authority to regulate public health and10 4safety confers discretion
to ignore these interests altogether.
V.

The Supreme Court Clarifies and Limits
Varig in Berkovitz

In Berkovitz v. United States,10 5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of governmental immunity in a regulatory
context similar to that in Varig. Berkovitz involved allegations brought on behalf of an infant, Kevan Berkovitz, who
was given a dose of Orimune, an oral polio vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories.106 Within a few weeks, the
child contracted paralytic poliomyelitis, which rendered him
severely paralyzed and dependent on a respirator. 0 7 The vaccine given to Berkovitz was part of a specific lot approved for
release by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)0 8 even
though the vaccine allegedly did not comply with
nonvirulence standards prescribed by government regulations. ' The-Division of Biologic Standards (DBS) of the Na103. See Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1985); Barnson v.
United States, 816 F.2d 549 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 299 (1987).
104. See W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 131, at 1042 (1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON], stating that courts have confused the issue of
duty and negligence with the issue of discretionary immunity.
105. 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988).
106. Id. at 1957.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1964.
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tional Institute of Health had licensed Lederle to produce the
vaccine.110 Berkovitz sued the United States under the FTCA,
alleging that the DBS had violated federal law in issuing the
drug manufacturer a license to produce Orimune and that the
FDA had violated federal regulations and policy in approving
its release to the public."'
The Supreme Court held that the discretionary function
exception did not bar either claim. 2 Adhering to the principles of Varig, the Court reiterated that "it is the nature of the
conduct" which "governs whether the discretionary function
exception applies. 11 3 The exception protects only those governmental actions and decisions which involve a "permissible
exercise of policy discretion.' 1 4 It does not apply when a spe15
cific course of action is prescribed by federal law or policy.
The Court then examined Berkovitz's allegation that the
DBS had issued a product license to Lederle Laboratories
without receiving test data as required by applicable statutes
and regulations." 6 The Court reasoned that in these circumstances the DBS had no discretion to issue a license. Therefore, the exception did not apply to bar the claim."'
Regarding Berkovitz's second claim, the Court found that
the regulatory scheme of the FDA, like that of the FAA in
Varig, permitted the agency to determine the appropriate
110. Id. at 1957.
111. Id. at 1960.
112. Id. at 1965.
113. Id. at 1958 (citing Varig, 467 U.S. at 813).
114. Id. at 1959. Citing its prior holdings in Varig and Dalehite, the Court defined as "discretionary" those decisions which involve judgment or choice and are
based on considerations of public policy. Id. at 1958-59.
115. Id. at 1958.
116. Federal law requires a drug manufacturer to obtain a product license before
marketing a vaccine. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (1982). To be eligible for such a license, the
manufacturer must test the product for safety at various stages of the manufacturing
process. 21 C.F.R. §§ 630.10, 630.15 (1988). After the required testing is completed,
the manufacturer must submit an application for a product license to the DBS. 21
C.F.R. § 601.2 (1988). The manufacturer is also required to submit test data with a
sample of the product. 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a) (1988). The DBS may issue a product
license "only upon examination of the product and upon a determination that the
product complies with the standards prescribed in the regulations .... " 21 C.F.R. §
601.2(a) (1988).
117. 108 S. Ct. at 1062.
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means of regulating the release of vaccine lots. ' The Court
stated that in this regulatory context, the discretionary function exception precludes any claim challenging an agency's
formulation of policy or the action of officials with discretion
to make independent judgments in carrying out policy.11 9 Applying these principles, the Court ruled that the exception did
not protect the FDA in this case because the agency's knowing
release of a defective vaccine violated its own policy of testing
all lots for compliance with safety standards and barring release of any non-complying lots.120 Since Berkovitz's claim
was directed at agency action which did not involve any policy
1 21
discretion, the exception did not apply.
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that the
exception presumptively "precludes liability for any and all
acts arising out of the regulatory programs of federal agencies.'12 As the decision demonstrates, even in a regulatory
context, governmental immunity has prescribed limits. A federal agency may not claim discretionary immunity when
agency policy does not permit, or the act itself does not involve, the exercise of policy discretion.' 2 3 In addition, the
Court reaffirmed the decision in Indian Towing, imposing liability for non-discretionary acts.' 2 Although the circuit courts
have questioned the precedential value of Indian Towing,' 5
118. Id. at 1964. 21 C.F.R. § 610.2(a) (1988) empowers the FDA to examine any
vaccine lot to prevent distribution of a non-complying lot but does not mandate a
particular course of action.
119. Id. at 1964. The Court based these conclusions on Varig, 467 U.S. at 819-20,
which held that the FAA's decision to use a process of inspection and certification
that involved spot-checking of the aircraft manufacturer's compliance with FAA
safety regulations and the implementation of the spot-check procedure by FAA employees were discretionary. Id. at 1959.
120. Id. at 1964.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1959-60.
123. Id. at 1964.
124. Id. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69 (government liable for failure to warn
vessels that lighthouse was not functioning properly, even though initial decision to
undertake and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary policy judgment).
125. See Merklin v. United States, 788 F.2d 172, 175 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (theory
that Indian Towing permits "Good Samaritan" claims under the FTCA undermined
by Varig).
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the Berkovitz Court removed any doubt that Indian Towing
still represents the applicable rule when non-discretionary
12 6
acts or omissions are at issue.
VI.

The Viability of the Failure to Warn Theory
after Berkovitz

The Supreme Court decision in Berkovitz effectively narrowed Varig by limiting sovereign immunity to discretionary
regulatory decisions that implicate important social, political,
and economic policies inappropriate for judicial review.' 27 In
reaffirming Indian Towing, the Court also held that the government may be subject to liability for negligent performance
of non-discretionary actions. 2 8 In spite of these limitations on
governmental immunity, however, the failure to warn theory
is not likely to prove any more viable an option than it had
been before Berkovitz. Like Varig, the decision provides discretionary function immunity for the actions of implementing
officials where agency policy permits them to exercise independent judgment. 2 9 As virtually every action involves some
element of discretion and may be said to implement agency
policy, the precise limits of "discretion" remain sufficiently
broad and indefinite to afford regulatory agencies considerable
immunity from tort liability. As recent cases demonstrate,
federal courts have consistently equated the absence of a preexisting safety requirement with "discretion," holding a failure to warn to be discretionary unless it represents a clear violation of federal law or agency policy.' 3 0 Since most regulatory
agencies operate under no such mandate, Berkovitz is unlikely
to effect a significant change in subsequent failure to warn
126. Id. 108 S. Ct. at 1959. In an effort to reconcile Indian Towing with its prior
holdings in Dalehite and Varig, the Court stated that Indian Towing "also illuminates the appropriate scope of the discretionary function exception" in circumstances
when the challenged conduct does not involve "any permissible exercise of policy discretion." Id. n.3.
127. Id. at 1959.
128. Id. at 1964.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. See also, Jones v. United
States, 698 F. Supp. 826 (D. Haw. 1988).
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litigation.
Two cases decided since Berkovitz illustrate the difficulties that face plaintiffs seeking recovery on a failure to warn
theory. In Wells v. United States,13 1 plaintiffs alleged that the
EPA failed to inform them of the health risks created by exposure to lead pollution, even though the agency had "continuously and gratuitously" monitored pollution levels in neighborhoods surrounding three lead smelters. 32 The plaintiffs
attempted to circumvent the government's discretionary function defense by arguing that the agency's decision not to warn
was based on scientific judgments rather than social, political
and economic policy and, therefore, was not protected by the
exception. 133 The court, however, disagreed and distinguished
this case from Berkovitz, holding that the EPA's program permitted the exercise of policy discretion by officials responsible
13 4
for its implementation.
In a similar vein, Jones v. United States"'6 ruled that the
government, in authorizing an independent contractor to use
the pesticide chlordane to treat a termite problem at United
States Air Force bases, was exercising policy judgment within
the discretionary function exception and thus could not be
held liable. 3 ' The court reasoned that issuing warnings requires the government to determine priorities and balance the
risks to the public health against the financial costs involved.1 37 Finding no statutory provision requiring the Air
Force to give advance notice to occupants of the bases, the
court held that "any such warning would have been purely an
act of discretion."1 38 Furthermore, a failure to consider
whether a warning should be issued was as much a discretionary function as a deliberate decision not to warn."3 9
131. 851 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 836 (1989).
132. Id. at 1472.
133. Id. at 1476-77.
134. Id. at 1477.
135. 698 F. Supp. 826 (D. Haw. 1988).
136. Id. at 834.
137. Id. at 833 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 820).
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting In Re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d 982, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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The issue raised by these and other post- Varig decisions
is whether, in the absence of any statutory provision or policy
requiring warnings, courts should automatically absolve federal agencies of any obligation in this regard, thus permitting
the government, "under the guise of policy-making," 40 to
deny reasonable notice to those whose health and safety may
be at risk.
In his dissent in Dalehite, Justice Jackson observed that:
The Government, as a defendant, can exert an unctuous
persuasiveness because it can clothe official carelessness
with a public interest. Hence, one of the unanticipated
consequences of the Tort Claims Act has been to throw
the weight of government influence on the side of lax
standards of care in the negligence cases which it
defends." 1
Justice Jackson's concern has proven prophetic in view of recent cases which emphasize the need for a more equitable
approach.
Federal courts have justified dismissal of failure to warn
claims on the basis of several unwarranted assumptions. The
first assumption, that all activity not mandated by federal law
is discretionary activity, is undermined by the Supreme Court
decision in Westfall v. Erwin."2 In Westfall, a civilian employee of the federal government sued his supervisors at an
army depot for failing to warn him of the presence of toxic
soda ash." 3 At the district court level, defendants successfully
argued that they were entitled to absolute immunity as federal employees acting within the scope of their employment."'
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and
ruled that federal officials enjoy absolute immunity from liability only when actions within the scope of their employment
140. Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877, 889 (D. Mass. 1984), rev'd, 790
F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1058 (1987).
141. 346 U.S. at 50 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
142. 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988).
143. Id. at 582.
144. Id. at 583.
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are discretionary in nature."4 5 The Supreme Court affirmed
and further rejected the contention that an action is discretionary as long as it is not mandated by law.' 46 Noting that
almost all official acts involve some element of choice, the
Court stated that given "such a wooden interpretation," the
discretionary function would lose all meaning.1 4 7 The Court
stressed the importance of weighing the benefits of official immunity against the costs. Absolute immunity, the Court held,
is justified only when the benefit of avoiding interference in
governmental functions outweighs the probability of recurring
harm to private individuals. 8
The significance of Westfall lies in its assertion that discretionary immunity does not attach simply because the particular conduct in question is not mandated by law. 9 Thus,
the fact that federal law does not impose a warning in certain
circumstances does not justify the conclusion that a failure to
warn is discretionary. Although Westfall addressed the issue
of sovereign immunity in a non-regulatory context and did not
involve the United States government as a party to the action,
there is no logical reason why the same standard should not
apply in a regulatory context as well. "Discretion" cannot
have one meaning for government officials and another for
government agencies. To hold otherwise would create an inconsistent standard not permitted by the language of the exception. 50 Furthermore, the Court implicitly endorsed the
need for consistency in holding federal officials to the same
"discretionary acts" requirement as regulatory agencies."'
A second assumption, implicit in the federal judiciary's
consistent reliance on the Varig rationale, is that failure to
warn is a discretionary nonfeasance comparable to the FAA's
145.
(1988).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Westfall v. Erwin, 785 F.2d 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1986) aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 580
108 S. Ct. at 584.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 585.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); see supra note 6.
108 S. Ct. at 585.
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alleged failure to inspect a particular aircraft.'5 2 However, this
view fails to recognize the distinction between a decision not
to warn and an agency's discretionary authority to formulate
policy and enforce regulations.1 53 In misapplying Varig, federal courts have incorrectly framed the issue raised by failure
to warn claims. The issue should be not whether or how to
provide a warning, but whether under the prevailing state law
the government, in failing to warn, breached a duty of care,
thereby creating an unreasonable risk of injury to the
plaintiff.
Furthermore, although the law of negligence differentiates between liability for misfeasance and for nonfeasance,' 5'
it recognizes a duty to act where a nonfeasance adversely affects another's interest.' 55 By implication, a duty to act may
require a warning where failure to do so would heighten the
risk of injury to another.
The third assumption, that imposing a duty to warn on
regulatory agencies would seriously disrupt the efficiency of
government operations, is untenable in the context of most
failure to warn cases. As some courts have observed, in the
typical hazard situation presented by these cases, a one-time
warning would be sufficient and would not present any serious
administrative or financial burden.' In such situations there
is no justification for relieving government agencies of all responsibility to warn of risks created by discretionary decisions
or to disclose information that would permit individuals to
protect their own health and safety. Federal courts should
recognize the distinction between failure to warn and other
regulatory decisions 5 7 and apply a standard which balances
152. 467 U.S. at 815.
153. The plaintiffs in Varig challenged the FAA's practice of ensuring compliance with minimum safety standards through a spot-check system in light of that
system's failure to detect defective aircraft.
154. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 101, § 56, at 373-75. Misfeasance is defined as "active misconduct" which causes injury to others and nonfeasance as "passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect them from harm." Id. at 375.
155. Id. at 375.
156. See Lindgren, 665 F.2d at 982; Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016,
1024 (9th Cir. 1985).
157. See Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976) in which the court
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the foreseeability and seriousness of the injury against the
burden inflicted by imposing a duty to warn.' 5 8 California
courts, for example, impose liability for failure to warn of
known or foreseeable dangers:
[W]hen (1) a party has information relating to a serious
risk to the life, safety or health of another; (2) the conduct of the party, though perhaps innocent gave rise to
the risk; (3) the burden resulting from imposition of a
duty to warn is not onerous; and (4) there is reason to
believe that a warning would have some practical effect. 159
This approach would encourage the exercise of reasonable
care by government agencies and provide a more equitable basis for determining liability under the FTCA.
VII.

Conclusion

As post-Varig decisions demonstrate, "the rule that 'the
king can do no wrong' still prevails at the federal level."' 60
Despite the precedent established by early cases permitting
failure to warn claims, federal appellate courts have uniformly
applied the Varig rationale in ruling against plaintiffs seeking
recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Berkovitz
decision, while limiting immunity to "discretionary" regulatory acts, reaffirms Varig by affording regulatory agencies
broad discretionary authority in performing their regulatory
functions. Reliance on Varig and Berkovitz to decide failure
to warn claims is misguided because failure to warn does not
represent the kind of regulatory decision at issue in these
cases. The more equitable approach considers failure to warn
as a separate and discrete issue, independent of other reguladifferentiates between policy decisions and separate determinations on individual
safety devices and warnings. Id. at 877 n.5-a.
158. See Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception and Mandatory Regulations, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 1300 (1987) advocating broader imposition of liability on
the part of the federal government based on "a theory of general dependence and
foreseeable harm." Id. at 1306.
159. Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985).
160. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987).
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tory acts and decisions, and looks to state tort law principles
to determine liability.
The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted to permit suit
against the government in circumstances where negligence by
a private individual would be actionable. However, the results
in cases decided since Varig suggest that an agency's practice
in issuing or not issuing warnings, unless specifically prescribed by federal statute or policy, is presumptively protected by the discretionary function exception. In according
regulatory agencies such deference, federal courts frustrate
the underlying purpose and intent of the Act. While regulatory agencies should have broad discretion in carrying out
their objectives, such discretion should not permit decisions
which expose private citizens to unnecessary risk of serious
injury.
Terri Stilo
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